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1. Introduction 
The public pension systems in Japan are compulsory social insurance pro-
grams that cover the entire nation and consist of several different plans accord-
ing to the category of employment， such as for employees of private companies， 
public workers， and self-employed persons. Although these systems are compul-
sory， there have been non-participants (more precisely， those who are in arrears 
with their pension premiums). Because al employees have their pension premi-
ums deducted at source from their salaries together with income tax， they cause 
no non-participation problem in principle. But， inthe case of the self-employed， 
they pay pension premiums by themselves， sothere have been cases in which 
those who do not want to join a public pension plan for some reason may refuse 
to pay their premiums， resulting in non-participation in the public system. 
What has often been pointed out not only for public pension but for insur-
ance in general as well is that adverse selection is a reason why individuals do not 
join an insurance plan， although there is the possibi1ity that some risk wi1l occur 
to them1• Adverse selection is the phenomenon by which although those who are 
insurable know well the risks they may suffer， insurers are obliged to charge 
premiums based on the assumption of an average risk， because insurers do not 
have information on the risks of insurable persons or because it incurs insurers 
too high a cost to gather such information. On the other hand， because insurable 
persons know their risks well， they try to take out insurance if their risks are 
higher than the average risk， because they think it wi1 be advantageous to buy 
insurance. 1n contrast， those who have lower risks than the average do not try 
to obtain insurance because it wi1l be disadvantageous for them to do so. As a 
result， the revenue and expenditure balance of insurance finance is disturbed. 
This situation will lead either to the collapse of insurance or to a small-scale 
insurance plan because of a rise of premiums. 1n the latter case， only those with 
high risks wi1l obtain insurance and no insurance wi1l be supplied to those having 
average risk. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. 
1f it is desirable from the viewpoint of efficiency to offer insurance to those 
with an average risk too， itcan be justified to make it a compulsory. 1n Japan， 
compulsory social insurance programs are now being introduced to help provide 
for such risk 
out individual annuity programs sold by private insurers， which are traditionally 
optiona1. To see if the adverse selection hypothesis is valid for Japan's pension 
systems， we conducted a questionnaire survey of individuals and analyzed the 
data obtained. Before outlining the survey and the resu1ts of the analyses， we 
wi1 take a look at prior studies on this subject. 
2. Prior studies and position of this study 
Aker10f (1970) took up the used car market and discussed the existence of 
adverse selection. Whi1e the sellers of used cars have more information on the 
quality of these cars than buyers， the latter cannot distinguish cars of good qual-
ity from poor quality ones. So the sellers offer both cars at the same price. 
Because poor-quality cars sel at the same price as good-quality ones， the latter 
are driven out of the market. He conc1udes that there may be a case in which no 
market is formed as a result. 
Adverse selection is often cited as a reason for the fai1ure of an insurance 
market or its malfunction. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) examined the 
existence of this phenomenon. Their study attempts to explain the fact that 
although the individuallife annuity market is highly developed in the U.S.， many 
Americans prefer wealth-holding to the purchase of individuallife annuity plans， 
contrary to the consumption聞savingbehavior within the framework of the life-
cycle model. They quote two reasons for this: the motive of leaving bequests to 
their heirs and the fact that yields on individuallife annuity plans are lower than 
yields on plausible altemative investments. They also say that the cause of the 
latter reason is that because those who buy an individual life annuity plan are 
main1y those having a long life， the life expectancy of the insured lengthens， 
resulting in higher premiums. Friedman and Warshawsky use a simulation 
model of the life聞cyc1ehypothesis and showed that the two reasons mentioned 
above can explain the phenomenon of Americans not purchasing individuallife 
annuity plans. Their study conc1udes that the occurrence of adverse selection 
increases the premiums of individuallife annuity plans， because buyers of these 
plans have a longer life span than the average life span， and that because the rate 
of return becomes lower than an actuarially fair level for those having an average 
life span， these individuals do not purchase this type of annuity product. Their 
hypothesis argues that because insurable persons display the adverse selection 
behavior， insurance companies are obliged to raise the premiums of their individ-
uallife annuity plans. They say that the high premiums of individuallife annu-
ity products are caused by the adverse selection behavior of insurable persons. 
Based on this hypothesis， Tajika and Hayashi (1996) take up the opti 
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the appropriateness of this hypothesis. However， according to their estimation， 
the increase of lifetime uti1ity resulting from participation in NPF is large both 
for men and women， and the rate of return for women who join NPF ishigher 
than that of those who join an actuarially fa廿pension.Therefore， Tajika and 
Hayashi conclude that no adverse selection takes place in Japan's NPF. 
As noted， the outcome of the study in the U.S. differs from that in Japan. 
Neither of these studies is based on data on individual insurable persons. Thus， 
in the present study we use these data on individuals and directly examine the 
existence of adverse selection. We conducted a questionnaire survey of individ-
ual respondents， asking them about their actual participation in public and pri・
vate pension plans， wi1lingness to join a public pension program if it is optional， 
the extent of the risk of old age， etc. Then we checked participation and wi1ling-
ness to join with the risk to examine the existence of adverse selection. If insur-
able persons' behavior is compatible with adverse， selection， those with a small 
risk should tend not to join pension plans. In the fol1owing sections， we wi1l 
outline our survey and the results of the analyses of the data obtained from it. 
3. Out1ine of the survey and attributes of the respondents 
Although we designed the questionnaire sheet， the questionnaire survey 
itself was entrusted to Chuo Chosa Sha (Central Research Inc.). The respon-
dents were 3，500 self-employed men and women aged 20 years and over sampled 
at random from the master samples of Chuo Chosa Sha， which covered 12 dis-
tricts in Japan from Hokkaido to Kyushu. We chose only self-employed persons 
because the purpose of our study was to analyze and examine the relations be-
tween the behavior of participation in pension， medical insurance and other 
social insurance plans， and the risk of individuals， sowe had to narrow the re-
spondents down to this group of individuals among whom it was considered 
non-participants in social insurance programs occurred mostly. 
The survey method was to mai1 the questionnaire to the respondents chosen 
and the survey was carried out from late February to ear1y March 1997. Of the 
3，500 persons， 1，799 returned the questionnaire (collection ratio: 51.4%). Be-
cause the master samples classified those in a managerial position into the same 
sub-group of the self-employed， we were unable to exc1ude the latter persons at 
the time of mai1ng and excluded them on1y after col1ecting the questionnaire. 
Because of this， ifwe remove those in a managerial position， the number of 
samples decreases by their number. It was also found later that the employees of 
private businesses were included among respondents because some of the self-
employed persons in the master samples had changed job; so， ifwe analyze self-
employed persons only， the samples decrease further. Because the respondents 
covered by the present study are selιemployed， among whom itis supposed there 
exist non-participants in public pension plans and the object of our analysis is to 
study the individuals' behavior of participation in these plans， respondents aged 
65 years and over who are the beneficiaries of these plans are excluded. As a 
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result， the total number of samples used in this study is 816 and this figure de幽
creases further if questionnaires with some unanswered questions exist(that is， if
some necessary data are not provided). Sixty剛threepercent of the respondents 
are males and 37% are females. Their average age is 50 and their average house-
hold income is￥7，870，000 a yea~. 
As a1ready noted， Japan's compulsory public pension systems differ accord-
ing to the category of employment. Selιemployed persons should join the Na-
tiona1 Pension. As of the date of the survey， the premium of the National 
Pension was ￥12，300 a month and the pension benefit differs according to the 
period of participation with an average of￥43，000 a month. 
4. Analysis of collected data 
4.1 Analysis using a cross summation table 
In this section， we ana1yze the respondents' answers to the questions related 
to the purpose of the present study. Here we use the respondents' expected life 
span as a variable that repv凶，entsthe risk of old age. Using a cross summation 
table， we examine the relations (1) between the respondents' expected life span 
and their actua1 participation in a public pension plan， (2) between expected life 
span and participation in a public pension plan if the plan was optional rather 
than compulsory， and (3) between the expected life span and purchase of an 
individual annuity plan. The expected life span we use in this cross summation 
table is in units of ten years. If insurable persons' behavior is consistent with the 
pheno皿enonof adverse selection， the higher the risk of old age of the respon-
dents is， that is， the longer their expected life span is， the greater is the tendency 
由eyshould show to join a pension plan. 
(1) The respondents' expected life span and their actuaI participation in a public 
pension plan 
First， letus look at the relations between the respondents' actual behavior of 
joining a public pension plan -as already noted， there have been some non-
participants in public pension plans although participation is compulsory in 
principle -and their expected life span (Table 1). The ratio ofthe respondents 
who actually join public pension systems is 92% of al the samples used. The 
shortest expected life span was in the 50s and we adopted life span groups in units 
of 10 years from 50s to 90s and over. In al of the life span groups， the actua1 
ratio of participation in a public pension plan is higher than 80%. Even ifthe 
respondents' expected life span is shorter， their participation ratio shows no trend 
of a marked decrease. This is because public pension plans are compulsory in 
principle so the free wi1l of the respondents (insurable. persons) is not reflected 
well on the participation ratios. 
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Table 1 Cross summation table of the respondents' expected life span in units often years 
and their actual participation in a public pension plan 
Expected life span in participation in a public pension plan 
units of ten years Do not participate Participate Total 
5 6 
50s 
16.7% 83.3% 100% 
10 61 71 
60s 
14.1% 85.9% 100% 
24 342 366 
70s 
6.6% 93.4% 100% 
20 282 302 
80s 
6.6% 93.4% 100% 
7 31 38 
90s and over 
18.4% 81.6% 100% 
Total 
62 721 783 
7.9% 92.1% 100% 
(2) The respondents' expected life span and their participa“on in a pnblic pen・
sion plan if the plan was optional rather than compulsory 
To examine how the respondents (insurable persons) would behave if the 
public pension system had been optional instead of compulsory， letus look at the 
relations between their behavior of joining a public pension plan if it was op-
tional rather than compulsory and their -expected life span (Table 2). The ratio 
of participation in an optional public pension plan is 72% for a1 the samples 
used. The samples we use for this analysis are only those respondents who actu-
ally join a public pension plan. About 30% of these samples state that they 
would not join any public pension plan if the plan was optional. By expected life 
span group， while the participation ratio is higher than almost 70% among the 
respondents whose expected life span in the 70s and over， the figure is smaller 
than 50% for those with an expected life span in the 50s and 60s.From this result 
and as far as the cross summation table shows， behavior in agreement with ad-
verse selection (that is， the lower the respondents' risk of old age is， the less they 
tend to join a pension plan) can be observed among the respondents (insurable 
persons)， although the phenomenon does not occur in a perfect form. 
(3) The respondents' expected life span and their purchase of an individual an・
nuity plan 
Final1y， we examine the relations between the respondents' behavior of 
buying an individual annuity plan sold on the private insurance market and their 
expected life span (Table 3). The participation ratio of a1 the samples used is 
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Table 2 Cross summation table of the respondents' expected life span in units often years 
and their participation in a public pension plan if the plan was optional 
Expected life span in participation in a public pension plan ifthe plan was optional 
units of ten years Do not participate Participate Total 
50s 
4 5 
80.0% 20.0% 100% 
60s 
33 28 61 
54.1% 45.9% 100% 
70s 
94 240 334 
28.1% 71.9% 100% 
80s 
56 220 276 
20.3% 79.7% 100% 
90s and over 
9 19 28 
32.1% 67.9% 100% 
Total 
196 508 704 
27.8% 72.2% 100% 
Table 3 Cross summation table of the respondents' expected life span in units often 
years and their purchase of an individual annuity plan 
Expected life span in participation in a public pension plan 
units of ten years Do not purchase Purchase Total 
50s 
5 6 
83.3% 16.7% 100% 
60s 
21 50 71 
29.6% 70.4% 100% 
70s 
130 232 362 
35.9% 64.1% 100% 
80s 
107 193 300 
35.7% 64.3% 100% 
90s and over 
14 24 38 
36.8% 63.2% 100% 
Total 
277 500 777 
35.6% 64.4% 100% 
64%. By expected life span group， the figure is 70%for those with a life span in 
the 60s and decreases to less than 65 % among those having a life span in the 70s 
and over. Thus， phenomena contrary to adverse selection are observed among 
the respondents. The possible reasons for this include that the respondents Cin-
surable persons) may not act reasonably because they cannot get accurate infor-
mation on individual annuity plans and that because insurers worry about the 
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adverse selection behavior of insurable persons， insurers may not supply them 
with sufficient life annuity products to provide for the risk of old age3• As for 
the latter possible cause， Tajika and Hayashi (1995) point out the fact that the 
products sold on the individual annuity market in Japan are mostly annuities 
having a limited pension payment period， whi1e there are poor sales of life annu-
ity products. 
4.2 Analysis using a logit model 
Because the analyses mentioned above use simple cross summation tables， 
the effects of other variables affecting the respondents in addition to their ex-
pected life span， that is， income， age， etc.， on their behavior of joining pension 
plans are not controlled. Thus， inthis section we analyze the factors of the 
behavior of participating in pension plans using a logit model containing vari-
ables other than expected life span as explanatory variables to control these other 
variables. 
(1) Logit analysis of the respondents' ac佃alparticipation in a public pension 
plan 
As for the data on the respondents' actual participation in a public pension 
plan analyzed here， we use dummy variable 0 for those respondents who do not 
join any public pension plan and 1 for those who actually participate in such a 
plan. The logit model we use for this analysis is the following equation: 
log (P/(J -p)) =α+BX 
where p isthe probabi1ty of actually joining a public pension plan， a isthe con-
stant term， B isthe row vector of the regression coefficient and X is the column 
vector of the explanatory variable. The explanatory variables used are sex 
(dummy variable for males: 0; that for females: 1)， age， number of chi1dren， 
educational background (the respondents are c1assified into five groups， junior 
high school graduates， high school graduates， professional / vocational schooI 
graduates， junior college / technical junior college graduates and university / 
graduate school graduates， and dummy variable 0 isused for junior high schooI 
graduates and 0 or 1 for al other groups according to the respondents' educa開
tional background)， expected life span， whether the respondents purchase an 
individual annuity plan (dummy variable for on-participants: 0; that for partici-
pants: 1)， household annual income and whether they own a house (dummy 
variable for those owning no house: 0; that for those owning a house: 1) 4. The 
sample size is 724 persons. 
The outcome of the estimate using the logit model is summarized in 
Table 4. According to the table， the factor of whether or not the respondents 
own a house is the only variable that is significant. The ratio of actual participa-
tion in a public pension plan of those owing a house is .higher than that of non-
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Table 4 Logit analysis of the probability of actuaUy joining a public pension plan 
Exp1anatory Variab1e Regression Standard Error Regression Coeficient/ Coefficient Standard Error 
Sex 0.21301 0.30857 0.69033 
Age 0.01229 0.01586 0.77486 
Number of chi1dren 0.14066 0.14922 0.94266 
High schoo1 graduate -0.65432 0.42942 -1.52370 
Professiona1/ vocationa1 -0.89665 0.55426 -1.61776 schoo1 graduate 
Junior college/technica1 1.15765 1.10202 1.05048 junior colege graduate 
University / graduate -0.06156 0.54107 -0.11378 schoo1 graduate 
Expected life span -0.01735 0.01729 -1.00361 
Whether or not the 
respondents purchase an 0.17386 0.28772 0.60426 
individua1 annuity p1an 
Househo1d annua1 income 0.00016 0.00029 0.56067 
Whether or not the 1.12662略* 0.33736 3.33953 respondents own a house 
Constant 2.04413 1.48233 1.37900 
Note:帥 and事indicatesignificance at the 1 and 5 % levels respectively. 
house owners. Because this factor is used as an indicator of assets in the logit 
analysis， there is the possibi1ity that the economic status of insurable persons has 
something to do with their behavior of joining a public pension plan. Because 
the variable， expected life span， isnot significant， the reason that some of the 
respondents do not join any public pension plan is not that there is behavior 
consistent with the adverse selection phenomenon among them Cinsurable per-
sons). Public pension plans are compulsory in principle， sowe have to examine 
the behavior of insurable persons by assuming that the plans are optional to see 
if adverse se1ection exists latently among them. The next subsection discusses 
this. 
(2) Logit analysis of participation in a public pension plan if the plan was op-
位。nalrather than compulsory 
We use the logit model referred to above in this analysis. In this case， how-
ever， p isthe probabi1ty of participation in a public pension plan if it was op-
tional to join the plan， whi1e the explanatory variables are the same as those of 
the equation above. The sample size is 650 persons. 
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Table 5 shows the result of the analysis and there are three significant vari-
ables: sex， age， and expected life span. Age shows the highest significance: the 
greater the respondents' age is， the more likely they are to try to join a public 
pension plan. This is probably because as they become older， their recognition 
of the risks of old age increases. Sex is also significant: women are more positive 
toward participation in a public pension plan than men. The reasons for this 
inc1ude the fact that women may attempt to avoid risks more than men and that 
because women live longer than men on average， they may be more responsive 
to the risk of old age than men. 
Expected life span is positive and significant， even after other variables are 
controlled. This means that the longer the expected life span of the respondents 
is， that is， the greater their risk of old age is， the more likely they are to try to 
join a public pension plan and this behavior is consistent with adverse selection. 
This suggests that if the insurer supplies an optionallife annuity product without 
regard to the risk of old age of individual insurable persons， there is a high pos-
sibility that adverse selection occurs. 
Table 5 Logit analysis of the probability of participation in a public 
pension plan u itwas optional to join the plan 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Error Regression Coeficient/ Coeficient Standard Error 
Sex 0.53185* 0.21206 2.50808 
Age 0.08606** 0.01203 7.15386 
Number of chiIdren -0.06364 0.10091 -0.63071 
High schol graduate 0.02994 0.27798 0.10772 
Professiona1/ vocational 
-0.05875 0.40054 -0.14667 school graduate 
Junior colege/technical 
0.57973 0.44984 1.28876 ju凶orcol1ege graduate 
University / graduate 
-0.03786 0.33169 -0.11414 school graduate 
Expected life span 0.03461申 0.01373 2.52066 
Whether or not the 
respondents purchase an 0.09760 0.20268 0.48154 
individua1 annuity plan 
Household annual income 0.00004 0.00015 0.24137 
Whether or not the 
-0.05471 0.29032 一0.18843respondents own a house 
Constant -5.98259村 1.19306 -5.01451 
Note:川 and事indicatesignificance at the 1 and 5 % levels respectively. 
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(3) Logit analysis of participation in an individual annuity plan 
Here again the logit model mentioned above is used and p isthe probabi1ity 
of participation in an individual annuity plan. While almost the same explana・
tory variables as those of the above-mentioned equation are used， the variable of 
whether or not the respondents buy an individual annuity product is excluded 
and that of whether or not they actually join a public pension plan is added. The 
sample size is 724 persons. 
The outcome of this logit analysis is shown in Table 6. Significant variables 
are household income and whether or not the respondents own a house. Because 
both are indicators of households' economic status， we may conc1ude that the 
better off the respondents are， the more likely they are to buy an individual annu-
ity product. This suggests that individual annuity products serve as an investment 
tool for affluent people who can afford to pay premiums. In addition， because 
the factor of whether or not the respondents actually join a public pension plan 
is not negatively significant， public pension plans and private pension products 
have no alternative relations that require selection between the two. 
Expected life span， an indicator of the risk of old age， isnot significant， so
Table 6 Logit analysis of the probability of participation in an individual annuity plan 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Regression Coefficient/ Coefficient Error Standard Error 
Sex 0.20436 0.17583 1.16223 
Age -0.01508 0.00973 -1.54997 
Number of children 0.02159 0.08878 0.24323 
High school graduate 0.21555 0.21341 1.01003 
Professional/ vocational 
0.36882 0.33634 1.09655 school graduate 
Junior college/technical 
0.55916 0.39676 1.40930 ju凶orcollege graduate 
University / graduate 
0.33796 0.27965 1.20854 school graduate 
Expected life span 0.00403 0.01108 0.36334 
Household annual income 0.00045* 0.00017 2.56432 
Whether or not the 
respondents join a 0.15909 0.29019 0.54823 
public pension plan 
Whether or not the 
0.78090*槻 0.24171 3.23073 respondents own a house 
Constant -0.41179 0.95667 -0.43045 
Note:叫 and傘indicatesignificance at the 1 and 5% levels respectively. 
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no adverse selection behavior is observed on the part of insurable persons. As 
already noted in the section regarding the cross summation table， there is the 
possibility that insurable persons cannot act reasonably because they cannot get 
accurate information on individual annuity products and that because insurers 
worry about the adverse selection behavior of insurable persons， insurers keep a 
low rate of return on life annuity products providing for the risk of old age， with 
the result that they do not supply these products adequately. In the latter case， 
the possibi1ty exists that there is the potential for adverse selection on the part 
of insurable persons. As for the rate of return of individuallife annuity products， 
Tajika and Hayashi (1995) point out that the rate of return of an annuity certain 
product is higher than that of a life annuity product and that the rate of return 
of a life annuity product is at a low level itself. 
From the foregoing， we can consider that most of the individual annuity 
products now on the market cannot play the role of life annuity plans， that is， of
providing for the risk of old age， but function on1y as means of asset manage-
ment for elder1y people up to a certain age. 
5. Conclusion 
This study examined the existence of adverse selection using questionnaire 
data on self-employed persons in Japan. The main conc1usions derived from the 
analyses are as fol1ows: First， there have been non-participants in public pension 
plans， which are compulsory in principle. This is not because those with a smal1 
risk of old age tend not to join these plans. There is the possibility that those 
having weak economic power avoid participating in the plans because they can-
not afford to pay the premiums. 
Second， the ana1ysis of the hypothetica1 case where participation in a public 
pension plan is optional instead of compulsory revea1ed that the greater the re-
spondents' risk of old age is， the more they tend to join such a plan. This sug-
gests that if insurers supply optionallife annuity products disregarding the risk 
of old age of individual insurable persons， adverse selection is highly likely to 
occur among these persons. 
Third， the analysis of the factors related to the purchase of individual annu-
ity products supplied on the private market shows that the risk of old age has no 
significant effect on the individua1s' behavior of buying these products and that 
the greater their economic power is， the more they tend to purchase an individual 
annuity product. If this result is combined with the outcome of the study con-
ducted by Tajika and Hayashi (1995)， itcan be considered that the individual 
annuity products sold now on the J apanese market are a form of asset manage-
ment for elder1y people up to a certain age rather than life annuity products. 
Therefore， asfar as the current market of individual annuity products in 
Japan is concerned， there is a high possibility that there are insufficient life anmト
ity products against the risk of old age provided. Therefore， given the present 
situation， we should not give private individua1 annuity products ωo important 
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a role as a step to provide for the risk of old age. 
Footnotes 
1 In a series of papers (Hatta et al. (1994)， Hatta (1996))， Hatta emphasizes the 
occurrence of adverse se1ection in the private insurance rnarket as a reason for the 
need to provide pension insurance as part of social insurance. 
2 For descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis， see Table 7 in 
appendix. 
3 As pointed out on the study in the U.S. referred to in Section 2， individual life 
annuity products are sold in the U.S.， but because those who actually buy these 
products are insufficient in nurnber， the rnarket does not seern to copc with the 
risk of old age adequately. 
4 Because the question in the questionnaire on household incorne divides the in-
corne groups in units of one rni1lion yen， we use the value inthe rniddle of each 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sex O 0.3713 0.4835 
Age 24 64 50.0613 9.7815 
Number of chi1dren 。 6 2.0762 0.9638 
Junior high school graduate O 0.2325 0.4227 
High school graduate 。 0.4400 0.4967 
Professiona1/ vocational 。 I 0.0888 0.2846 school graduate 
Junior col1ege/technical 。 0.0675 0.2510 junior college graduate 
University / graduate 。 0.1712 0.3770 
school graduate 
Expected life span 50 113 75.7474 7.3978 
Household annual income 50 19800 787.3578 885.7155 
Whether or not the 
O 0.8689 0.3378 respondents own a house 
Whether or not the r凶pon司
O 0.9200 0.2715 dents join a public pension plan 
Whether or not the respon-
dents join a public pension plan O 1 0.7249 0.4469 
if the plan was optional 
Whether or且otthe respon-
dents purchase an individual O 1 0.6406 0.4801 
annuity plan 
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group as data for the analysis. Respondents having an income of ￥15 mil1ion or 
more (the highest income group) are asked to enter their actual income amount 
rather than checking the appropriate column， sofor these respondents we use the 
figures they enter as they are. 
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